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Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

Plaintiff, Cove Properties, Inc. ("Cove"), and defendant, Walter
Trent Marina, Inc. ("Walter Trent"), owned adjoining land fronting
Terry Cove in Baldwin County, Alabama. Upon the issuance of
appropriate permits, Walter Trent constructed a pier extending
southward 350 feet from its shoreline onto submerged property leased
to Walter Trent from the State of Alabama. The leased property was
also within navigable waters. Under suspicion that Walter Trent's pier
encroached onto Cove's waterfront property, Cove had the boundary
between its property and Walter Trent's property surveyed. The survey
evidenced an encroachment of the southern end of Walter Trent's
pier onto and in front of Cove's property.
The trial court dismissed Cove's declaratory judgment action
requesting injunctive relief, damages, 'just compensation," and
damages under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. The court of appeals affirmed
the dismissal of the just compensation and section 1983 claims, but
reversed the dismissal of Cove's claims for declaratory judgment,
injunctive relief and damages, and remanded.
On remand, Walter Trent filed a motion for summary judgment
and Cove filed a motion for partial summary judgment. Walter Trent
claimed the encroachment did not violate Cove's property rights
because the encroachment was within navigable waters. Moreover,
Walter Trent provided substantial supporting documentation and
authority. The trial court granted Walter Trent's motion for summary
judgment and denied all relief requested by Cove.
Cove appealed the judgment. The court of appeals affirmed the
trial court's order for summary judgment with respect to Walter
Trent's rights for that portion of the pier that extended into navigable
water. The court reversed the judgment as it applied to Walter Trent's
rights for that portion of the pier above the high water mark and
Cove's riparian rights up to the point of navigable waters.
The Supreme Court of Alabama granted certiorari and considered
whether one waterfront property owner may build in front of the
riparian lands of an adjacent waterfront property owner. The court
reviewed the statutory rights of riparian landowners set forth in
Alabama Code sections 33-7-50 through 33-7-54. Such provisions
authorize the installation of certain named structures in front of a
landowner's riparian land. The court interpreted the statutes, giving
unambiguous terms their plain meaning.
The supreme court
determined that the statutes explicitly disallowed construction of
structures that extend in front of another's riparian land. Therefore,
the supreme court determined Walter Trent was not authorized to
construct its pier in front of Cove's riparian land, regardless of the
pier's location within navigable waters.
Megan Becher-Harris

Russell Corp. v. Sullivan, No. 1981074, 2000 Ala. LEXIS 340 (Ala. Aug.
4, 2000) (holding a state power company did not commit trespass or
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nuisance upon homeowners' property by allowing textile plants to
discharge chemicals into an adjacent lake, and the homeowners failed
to carry their burden of proof as to their claims of nuisance and
trespass against textile plants).
Russell Corporation ("Russell"), Avondale Mills ("Avondale"), and
the Alabama Power Company ("APCo") appealed a property damage
judgment against them due to their chemical release into Lake Martin.
The jury in the trial court awarded $155,000 in compensatory damages
and $52,000,000 in punitive damages to homeowners of property
adjacent to Lake Martin.
Russell and Avondale operated textile plants in Alexander City.
The textile process created wastewater containing dyes treated at the
Sugar Creek Plant. The treated wastewater then traveled into
Elkahatchee Creek and continued until it reached Lake Martin. The
homeowners claimed that because of the excessive amount of waste
from the textile plants, the Sugar Creek Waste Treatment facility was
unable to keep biosolid waste from entering Lake Martin and washing
onto their property. After the homeowners noticed floating waste
splashing upon their property, they brought a property damage action
against the owners of the textile plants and APCo. APCo owned and
operated Lake Martin pursuant to a Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission ("FERC") license. The trial court granted verdicts against
all defendants, and the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed.
Russell, Avondale, and APCo argued the trial court should have
granted their motion for a judgment as a matter of law. The supreme
court examined the homeowner's evidence to determine whether it
The court
supported the elements of trespass and nuisance.
determined the homeowners' claims against APCo relied on basic tort
theory. The homeowners claimed APCo had a duty to keep Lake
Martin cleaned up to the 490-degree contour line. The court decided
to treat APCo's trespass and nuisance claim separately from Russell
and Avondale's because APCo's did not discharge waste into the lake.
Although APCo did not discharge waste into the lake, the
homeowners argued trespass occurred when APCo (1) allowed Russell
and Avondale to discharge waste into Lake Martin; and (2) allowed the
waste to remain on the shores of the lake. The court concluded APCo
did not trespass on the homeowners' property because APCo neither
intentionally entered nor intentionally caused some substance or thing
to enter upon the homeowners' property. The court also ruled the
homeowners lacked proof that APCo either directed, aided, or
participated in Russell or Avondale's waste discharge into the lake.
Second, the homeowners argued APCo allowed a nuisance to be
created and maintained on the homeowners' property. The court
stated the homeowners must prove APCo had a duty to control the
discharged waste from the textile plants. The homeowners relied on
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APCo's FERC license to prove its duty to control. The court, however,
ruled the FERC license did not create a duty for two reasons: (1) the
residents failed to plead any federal law violations or allege a federal
license breach in their motion opposing removal to federal court; and
(2) the federal court was the only place where a FERC license violation
would be entertained. The court ruled that a reservoir owner was not
liable when no evidence indicated APCo's authorization, participation,
or control over discharges into the reservoir. As a result, the court
reversed the trial court's decision against APCo on both the nuisance
and trespass claims.
The court then addressed the trespass claims against Russell and
Avondale. Because the trial court determined Russell and Avondale
were responsible for their discharges into Lake Martin, the court first
distinguished between indirect and direct trespass. The court stated
that in order for an action of indirect trespass to succeed, the
homeowners' evidence must prove the textile plants discharges
entered upon the homeowners' property and in some way affected the
nature and character resulting in substantial actual damage. The
court maintained that water from the lake could have entered upon
land, however, the evidence supporting
the homeowners'
contamination of the water was insufficient.
The homeowners argued their evidence supported a claim of
trespass. The court held the homeowners had failed to prove a
substantial actual injury and could not sustain their trespass claim as a
matter of law. The court explained that the lake bottom sludge was
never chemically tested, and furthermore, the homeowners failed to
show that this waste relocated onto their property. Without scientific
evidence of chemical toxicity or actual relocation, the court reasoned
the jury had based their factual conclusions on inferences. The court
ruled that in the absence of scientific data, findings of actual
substantial damage could not be sustained by inferences.
The court likewise rejected homeowners' nuisance claim. The
residents brought a private nuisance action and relied on the court's
prior holding in Elmore v. Ingalls. In Elmore, the court held that
because plaintiffs owned the stream water as it flowed through their
land, the plaintiffs had a right to prevent others from contaminating
that water. However, the court maintained the homeowners' reliance
on Elmore was misplaced. The court reasoned the private nuisance
claim failed because the homeowners owned no part of Lake Martin.
The court agreed with Russell and Avondale's argument that only a
public nuisance action existed. Moreover, the homeowners failed to
prove the nuisance prevented them from enjoying their own property.
The right to use Lake Martin was a public right and the homeowners
failed to raise a public nuisance claim. Thus, the homeowners
expressly waived their right to action. Therefore, the court reversed
the trial court's nuisance judgment in favor of the homeowners.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court of Alabama found the trial
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court erred in denying Russell, Avondale's, and APCo's motion for
judgment as a matter of law. The judgments for the homeowners on
both the trespass and nuisance claims were reversed and rendered in
favor of Russell, Avondale, and APCo.
Jon Hyman
Snyder v. Howard Plumbing & Heating Co., No. 2991066, 2000 Ala.
Civ. App. LEXIS 578 (Ala. Civ. App. Sept. 15, 2000) (holding sewage
that intrudes onto property supports an action for indirect trespass).
Lee and Patricia Snyder ("Snyders") brought suit against both
Howard Plumbing and Heating Company ("Howard") and Pate
Construction Company ("Pate") for improperly connecting a sewerservice line to the Snyders' home resulting in sewage flooding the
Snyders' basement. The trial court granted summary judgment to
Howard and Pate on all of the Snyders' claims. The Snyders appealed
only the trespass claim.
The Snyders' built their home in 1978. In 1986, Pate constructed a
house ("Pate house") on the lot adjacent to the Snyders' home.
Howard, the plumbing contractor, connected the Pate house sewer
line. In both 1995 and 1998, sewage flooded the Snyders' basement.
Upon investigation, the Snyders discovered that the Pate house sewerservice line had been connected erroneously to the Snyders' sewerservice line, instead of to the main sewer line. At trial, all parties
agreed the clogged line caused the flooding. However, the Snyders
argued Pate's improper sewer line connection to the Snyders' line
increased the sewage flooding into the Snyders' basement.
The court of appeals first considered whether the Snyders' claim
was for trespass on the case, whereby such claim was barred by a twoyear statute of limitations, or for indirect trespass, which would still be
actionable under a six-year statute of limitations. The court of appeals
relied on several earlier Alabama cases and determined that surface
water channeling onto another's property supported a claim for
indirect trespass. Although the prior cases dealt primarily with
intrusion by surface water, the court found no distinction between
those cases and the intrusion of sewage here.
The court of appeals next considered whether the record
evidenced a genuine issue of material fact with regard to an indirect
trespass claim to warrant reversal of summary judgment. The court of
appeals concluded that substantial evidence existed to support the
inference that Howard negligently connected the Pate's sewer-service
line to the Snyders' sewer-service line, and that a trier-of-fact could
reasonably infer that the negligent connection caused foreseeable
flooding. Additionally, the court of appeals determined that a
reasonable inference could be made that the sewage, which flooded
the Snyders' basement, flowed downhill from the Pate house. Thus,

